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Abstract 
This paper examines the emerging cultural patterns and interpretative repertoires in 
reports of an impending pandemic of avian flu in the UK mass media and scientific 
journals at the beginning of 2005, paying particular attention to metaphors, 
pragmatic markers ('risk signals'), symbolic dates and scare statistics used by 
scientists and the media to create expectations and elicit actions. This study 
complements other work on the metaphorical framing of infectious disease, such as 
foot and mouth disease and SARS, tries to link it to developments in the sociology of 
expectations and applies insights from pragmatics both to the sociology of metaphor 
and the sociology of expectations. 
 
 
Avian Flu: The creation of expectations in the interplay between science and 
the media   
Little birds with scarlet legs, 
Sitting on their speckled eggs, 
Eye each flu-infected city.  
(W. H. Auden, 1951) 
 
 
Introduction 
The war against infectious disease has been won. Advances in science, especially the 
discovery of antibiotics and the use of vaccines, have led to the closing stages of 
humanity's struggle with infectious disease. Or so the story went - until quite 
recently (Armstrong et al. 1999). The rise of antimicrobial resistance, alongside 
increased recognition of the threat of new infectious diseases, most notably AIDS and 
most recently SARS, has removed any such complacency. Lately, fear of disease has 
been fuelled yet again by the emergence of a new highly pathogenic virus strain of 
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avian influenza that could jump the species barrier between birds and humans, and, 
in a worst-case scenario, cause the next global pandemic of influenza. 
The story of global influenza pandemics began in 1918 when 50 million people 
were infected worldwide with an influenza strain subsequently identified as avian in 
origin and recently reconstructed in an American laboratory (Tumpey et al. 2005). 
Although there had been one other flu pandemic before that date, in 1889, when the 
Russian flu suddenly appeared in St Petersburg and, in a matter of months, spread 
across most of the world (Smith 1995), 1918 seems to serve as an 'index' date in 
news coverage of existing and emerging epidemics and pandemics. The 1918 
pandemic („Spanish flu‟) was followed by two other 20th-century pandemics in 1957 
(„Asian flu‟) and 1968 („Hong Kong flu‟).  
The story of a new 21st-century virus that could lead to a new pandemic 
began in 1997 when bird flu broke out in Hong Kong and infected humans. This was 
a new strain of avian flu, the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain (Lin et al. 2000; 
Cyranoski 2001). 18 people were infected and six people died; all had had close 
contact with chickens. Chicken exports were banned, about 1.6 million chickens were 
slaughtered and the virus seemed to have been eradicated. 
 
That event alarmed public health authorities, as it marked the first time that 
an avian influenza virus was transmitted directly to humans and caused 
severe illness with high mortality. Alarm mounted again in February 2003, 
when an outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in Hong Kong caused 2 cases and 
1 death in members of a family who had recently travelled to southern China. 
Another child in the family died during that visit, but the cause of death is not 
known. (WHO 2004) 
 
In 2003 Hong Kong also suffered greatly from another new infectious disease, Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome or SARS, which had initially been taken for avian 
influenza when it had broken out in the Guangdong province of China in November 
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2002. In 2003 another outbreak of avian flu, this time the H7N7 strain, occurred in 
the Netherlands and killed a 57-year-old veterinarian. At the same time the H5N1 
strain re-emerged and devastated a commercial poultry farm in South Korea. In 
2004 outbreaks of H5N1 occurred in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and 
China, where pigs and wild geese were also infected. In January 2004 laboratory 
tests confirmed the presence of the H5N1 avian influenza virus in human cases of 
severe respiratory disease in the northern part of Vietnam. So far (November 2005) 
130 humans have been infected and half of them have died. In the autumn of 2005 
the virus spread from East Asia to Russia and to Eastern Europe, carried by migrating 
birds. A consignment of finches infected with H5N1 arrived in Britain and two parrots 
died in a quarantine centre. 
On February 5, 2005 an editorial for New Scientist warned readers that a bird 
flu outbreak in which the virus would be transmitted not from poultry to people but 
between people could kill 1.5 billion and that science and society were not prepared 
(Editorial/New Scientist 2005). Similar warnings had appeared in the UK press in 
2003 and 2004, but were published with increased frequency following the 
publication of a paper investigating suspected cases of human-to-human 
transmission in January 2005. Our article examines the UK press reaction to such 
warnings between January and June 2005, with a focus on a two-months corpus of 
51 articles published in UK national newspapers in February and March 2005, a time 
when the British government announced a first version of its pandemic preparedness 
plan. The Department of Health published the final version on 19 October 2005 (DoH 
2005).  
Avian influenza, more popularly known as bird flu, has attracted increased 
media coverage since the end of 2004, a coverage that intensified even more after 
this analysis of a mid-2005 corpus was completed, especially in October 2005 (see 
Nerlich in prep).  
In their seminal article on the rise and fall of risk reporting, Kitzinger & Reilly 
(1997) have examined which risks attract public attention and why the media pick up 
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(and then drop) a particular „risk‟ issue (see Washer, 2006). Although avian flu was 
one of a series of emergent or re-emergent diseases which had affected the UK 
directly or threatened to affect it, such as AIDS, BSE, foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
and SARS, in 2004 it was still what Joffe and Haarhoff, in their article on Ebola (Joffe 
and Haarhoff 2002), call a „far flung illness‟ about which the UK media could not 
easily write human interest stories, one of the key factors in attracting media 
attention. Instead, the initial surge in UK media coverage explored in this article 
seems to have been triggered by one of the other factors explored by Kitzinger and 
Reilly, namely the increasing amount of activity by pressure groups, professional 
bodies and politicians, in our case the World Health Organisation (WHO) in particular. 
A second surge in media interest, later in 2005, had a somewhat different source and 
needs to be explored separately. At the beginning of 2005 avian flu was still „out 
there‟ in a foreign land, affecting „others‟. Towards the end of 2005 the virus had 
spread to Eastern Europe and had even been detected in a consignment of birds in 
the UK. From being „out there‟, it now seemed to be „almost here‟. This increased the 
proximity of the threat and with it its newsworthiness. 
  
Aims and objectives 
This paper intends to complement other work on the sociology of infectious diseases 
and on the metaphorical framing of infectious diseases and invasive species, 
especially in relation to FMD and SARS (Nerlich, Hamilton, and Rowe 2002; Wallis 
and Nerlich 2005; Washer 2004). Unlike previous papers, which mainly focused on 
establishing links between conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) 
and a sociology of metaphors (Maasen and Weingart 2001), this paper attempts to 
establish a link between the sociology of metaphors, the sociology of expectations 
(which is mostly used at present to study the hype and hope associated with new 
biotechnologies in the context of Science and Technology Studies). It will be argued 
that the newspaper articles examined for this paper can only be understood from the 
point of view of a sociology of negative expectations. This type of analysis is closely 
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related to research done on the 'sociology of fear' (Strong 1990, Tudor 2003, Béland 
2005), which might be regarded as a counterpart to a sociology of expectations. 
Insights from studying the media coverage of avian influenza could also be used to 
explore links between the „risk society‟ thesis (Beck 1992) and the „fear society‟ 
thesis (Furedi 2002, 2005), but this will not be the focus of our article. 
 We argue that just like the positive expectations or predictions surrounding 
biotechnology, negative expectations or predictions in the form of 'early warnings' 
can have a performative force; they can spur individuals and governments into 
actions, such as buying avian flu masks advertised on almost every website dealing 
with avian flu, or publishing avian flu contingency plans. As Nik Brown points out: 
"expectations mobilize the future into the present" (Brown 2003: 3). However, if 
early promises and early warnings are issued too early, too frequently or in a context 
of heightened scientific and social uncertainty, they may also have the opposite 
effect of demoralising individuals and society, neutralising urgency, producing 
cynicism and indifference and stifling sustained investment. 
In order to contribute to a sociology of negative expectations from a linguistic 
(metaphorical) perspective, we want to find answers to questions such as: Which 
rhetorical devices, be they pragmatic markers, metaphors or references to pertinent 
historical events, were used by experts and the media to create which type of images 
of the future in order to mobilize what kind of action in the present? What were 
metaphors and other devices used for -- to inform, to warn, to blame, etc. -- and by 
whom were they used, the experts or the media?  
 
Material 
In order to study the UK media coverage of the avian flu threat we used LexisNexis 
Professional, which provides full-text access to newspapers. We initially carried out a 
broad search of all UK newspapers between 2000 and 2005, then of UK national 
newspapers between January and June 2005, thereafter a narrower one of national 
newspapers in February and March 2005, using the key words avian and pandemic to 
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define our corpus. The two-months sample formed our main corpus of 51 articles. 
The size of this corpus might appear to be small were we conducting a wholly 
quantitative investigation. But it is appropriate and also just manageable for an in-
depth qualitative analysis and, in our case, for testing a new conceptual link between 
metaphor analysis, pragmatics and the sociology of expectations. 
Additionally, we searched the web for background material on avian flu in 
scientific publications published between January 2005 and June 2005, and cross-
matched the results with sources quoted in UK newspapers (see Stöhr 2005, 
Ungchusak et al., 2005, Gottlieb 2005, AAAS 2005, DoH 2005, WHO 2005, 
Editorial/Nature 2005, Editorial/New Scientist 2005, Editorial/Lancet 2005, 
Editorial/Scientific American, 2005). 
 
Methods and conceptual framework 
A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods were used in the analysis of the 
media output. Qualitative content and conceptual analysis were combined with 
pragmatics, metaphor analysis and the sociology of expectations. We used a soft 
version of content analysis to search for frequency patterns in the use of metaphors 
and pragmatic markers. Coding therefore focused on identifying markers, such as 
„warn‟, „alarm‟, „frighten‟ and so on, and on the identification of metaphors. The first 
was achieved through the use of a simple search function applied to our corpus. To 
identify metaphors human judgement is still needed, although some automated 
metaphor searching is being pioneered by Cameron for example (Cameron and 
Stelma 2004). For this small study the two authors, both well acquainted with the 
cognitive linguistic literature on metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), each coded the 
corpus for metaphors and compared results. The overlap was almost a 100%. 
Pragmatics served as the link between metaphor analysis and the sociology of 
expectations. It allowed us to study language in situation and to analyse 
pronouncements by scientists and the media as „speech acts‟ "in which the rules of 
language and of society combine in determining meaning, intended as a socially 
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recognized object sensitive to social expectations about the situation in which the 
utterance to be interpreted is embedded" (Capone 2005: 1355).  
It is customary to distinguish in linguistics between semantics, which deals 
with the abstract meaning of words and sentences, and pragmatics, which deals with 
the meaning or force of utterances or speech acts used in situation. Pragmatics has 
its roots in Austin's philosophy of language, developed in the 1950s (Austin 1962). 
From a pragmatic point of view one can distinguish between three factors in verbal 
communication: Locution (what utterances say), illocution (what utterances do - 
perform), and perlocution (what utterances achieve). The sentence "This dog is 
dangerous", for example, states that 'this dog is dangerous', but it can have the 
illocutionary force of warning someone about this particular dog (a force that can be 
made more explicit by saying "I hereby warn you that this dog is dangerous") and it 
can have the perlocutionary effect of frightening or alarming the person to whom this 
utterance is addressed. The intention of the speaker is to warn the hearer and the 
expectation is that the hearer or audience takes appropriate action. The force of 
speech acts can be conveyed indirectly through the situation of use or directly 
through illocutionary force markers (e.g. warn, alert, etc.). Perlocutionary force 
markers can indicate the effect that speech acts have had on hearers or are 
supposed to have on hearers (e.g. alarm, frighten, scare, fear, threaten, etc.).  
For our purposes we have also looked at the words used by scientists and the 
media to convey the „perlocutionary‟ force of events or statistics, as in "Few cases of 
human-to-human transmission have been suspected - one of the key factors in a 
pandemic - but scientists are so alarmed that the World Health Organisation has 
declared it one of the gravest threats to global health" (Henderson 2005:18, italics 
added). This might be going beyond what Austin would have called perlocutionary 
force markers, but, like the use of the more straightforward illocutionary force 
markers, as in „scientists warn that…‟, such uses of „alarm‟ or „frighten‟ are important 
to note for a study of the creation of expectations in the interplay between science 
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and the media. They are part of what some social amplification of risk theorists, such 
as Kasperson (1992), might call „risk signals‟. 
Klaus Stöhr, coordinator of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) influenza 
programme, wrote, for example, in his editorial for the New England Journal of 
Medicine (NEJM) on January 27, 2005: "the warning signal has been clearer than 
ever since 1968, when the last pandemic occurred, and there is an unprecedented 
opportunity to intensify worldwide preparedness" (2005: 405) and: "The emergence 
of human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection in Asia is an 
unprecedented warning and has given the world more time to prepare than anyone 
might have expected." (p. 406) Scientists issuing these direct and indirect early 
warnings expect global preparedness to increase, or, to quote a speech act theorist: 
"to bring about effects that modify a situation and change the roles of the 
participants within it or to bring about other types of effects" (Capone 2005: 1357). 
The occurrence of H5N1 is therefore not only a threat but also an opportunity to 
science, national governments and global health organisations to 'get their act 
together'. Early warnings, like early promises, have a pragmatic force. 
In his early writings Austin made a distinction between constatives (such as 
“The cat is on the mat”) and performatives (such as “I hereby pronounce you man 
and wife”), a distinction that later collapsed. Many speech act theorists now regard 
all utterances as „performative‟ in one way or another – even statements or 
constatives can „do‟ things in this sense. And this seems to apply not only to speech 
acts, but also to expectations. Brown has argued that 
 
Expectations can be performative also in the sense that promises are 
performative. The phrase 'I promise X' is not just a description, it makes the 
person who enunciates the phrase accountable for doing X (or a version of X). 
[…] this is how early promises and early warnings lead to reactions and 
sometimes to escalating arguments for and against […]. (2003:3, italics 
added)  
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It has become clear in recent years that metaphors, too, can be not just 
representational, but performative. "The work of metaphor", Bono argues, "is not so 
much to represent features of the world, as to invite us to act upon the world as if it 
were configured in a specific way like that of some already known entity or process." 
(Bono 2001: 227) Metaphors can be used by experts and the media to shape visions 
of the past and/or the future to try and affect our social and political actions in the 
present. They can also be used to orientate users (whether as institutions, groups or 
individuals) to particular possibilities for action and have an effect on material 
investment (Brown 2003). 
The study of pragmatic markers (risk signals), expectations and metaphors 
and the links between them is important as the way they function in discourse, be it 
scientific, political or media discourse, has direct implications for the allocation or 
misallocation of resources. It is also useful to study how their function changes, 
intentionally or unintentionally, when they move from one sphere of discourse to 
another, especially from scientific journal to the mass media. Monitoring early 
promises on the one hand and early warnings on the other (both of which use 
metaphors and other rhetorical devices) should be part of the social study of science, 
as early promises might eventually give way to disillusionment, and as too many 
early warnings might give way to cynicism, disengagement and a decline in trust in 
science and science-based policy (Brown 2003: 3)  
This problem is particularly acute in the case of avian flu where the strategic 
deployment of pragmatic markers and metaphors may contribute to what we shall 
describe as a 'rhetoric of fear', which, while implicating the need for appropriate 
'actions', has an air of ambiguity as to the nature of these actions, when to execute 
them and how much governmental resources should be allocated to them. 
In the following, we shall first summarise the results of a mainly quantitative 
survey of the UK press reaction to such early warnings, then delve into a more 
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qualitative analysis focusing on the pragmatic markers and metaphors used by 
scientists, experts, politicians and the UK media.   
 
Patterns of press coverage 
We first tried to establish when exactly avian flu caught the UK media's attention. 
Avian flu was not a topic that attracted any significant press coverage until 2004, 
when there was suddenly an explosion of articles, just as there was an explosion of 
the virus (for this search we examined all UK newspapers, regional and national). In 
the year 2000 five articles were published on the topic, in 2001 only one (probably 
because of the outbreak of FMD and September 11), in 2002 three, in 2003 14 (this 
was the year of the SARS outbreak and of an outbreak of avian flu, the H7N7 strain, 
in the Netherlands); then, in 2004, 112 articles were published, followed by 156 
articles just between January and July 2005.  
 
------ 
Figure 1: Articles published on avian flu and pandemics in all UK newspapers 
between January 2000 and July 2005 
----- 
 
This explosion of interest seems to have been triggered by an announcement by the 
WHO in December 2004 urging all countries to develop or update their pandemic 
strategies. In January 2005 the WHO then published a report entitled "Avian 
influenza: assessing the pandemic threat" (WHO 2005). Chapter 1 was entitled: "The 
H5N1 outbreaks in 2004: a pandemic in waiting?" - which evokes the image of a 
killer about to pounce on an unsuspecting victim and can be regarded as a case of an 
indirect warning, an image which is however mitigated by the question mark. At the 
same time the NEJM, New Scientist and the BMJ all speculated about human-to-
human transmission of bird flu. 
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To get a clearer picture of the UK press activity in the months that followed 
this global warning, we broke down the number of articles published by the national 
newspapers only for each month between January and July 2005 (when we began to 
write this article). The news activity peaked in February and March 2005 and we 
therefore chose these two months of press coverage as a corpus for closer qualitative 
analysis. This sample contains 51 articles. 
 
----- 
Figure 2: Articles on avian flu and pandemics published in UK national press 
between January and July 2005 
----- 
 
We also wanted to assess which national newspapers were the most active in the 
field. The Times, a centre right broadsheet, published by far the most articles on 
avian flu, sometimes several a day (as part of the main newspaper and as part of the 
supplement, Times 2 and its weekend health/lifestyle supplement on Saturdays). It 
was followed by The Guardian, a left/environmental newspaper. Surprisingly, the 
other two broadsheets, The Daily Telegraph and The Independent published almost 
as few articles on the matter as the tabloids. This distribution will probably look quite 
different for the latter part of 2005 when the tabloids, especially the Daily Mail, took 
up the avian flu story in a big way, as it was now perceived as knocking on „our‟ 
door. 
Most articles published in the national newspapers in February and March 
2005 appeared in the leader pages of the home news sections, which is testament 
not only to the perceived significance of the reports made by the WHO and other 
organisations but also to the media's explicit acknowledgement of the global nature 
of the threat. Several newspapers, however, were keen to domesticate the potential 
effects of the virus by confining their reports largely to an analysis of the potential 
risks faced by Britons or "Brits". The articles were usually to be found in the Health 
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sections, but there were also several featured reports, particularly in the month of 
March, and the pandemic threat was occasionally mentioned in smaller sections, 
including The Times's "Public Agenda", The Guardian's "Comment and Analysis" and 
even the Sport section of The Mirror. Article length ranged from minor references of 
under 100 words to longer featured items of over 1000 words, creating an average 
length of about 400 words. Only two articles were long investigative pieces, one 
published in the Daily Mail on 5 March and one published in the Observer Magazine 
on 20 March.  The (much awaited) announcement of the UK government's plans for a 
potential pandemic – that is the response to the WHO‟s warnings – on March 2 
attracted by far the most coverage. The plans were published on March 4. On March 
5 The Lancet, one of the most prestigious British medical journals, published an 
editorial entitled "Avian influenza: perfect storm now gathering?" (Lancet, 2005) and 
reported that: "On February 21, Julie Gerberding, Director of the US CDC called avian 
influenza a 'very ominous' threat to human beings. Shigeru Omi, WHO Western 
Pacific Regional Director, said the world is in 'the gravest possible danger of a 
pandemic'." The phrase 'gravest possible danger' was quoted six times in the two-
months corpus (February-March, 2005).  
One article investigating a possible human-to-human transmission of avian 
flu, published in the NEJM on January 27, 2005, seems to have been seminal 
(Ungchusak et al. 2005) in stirring press interest. It was accompanied by an editorial 
by Stöhr entitled "Avian influenza and pandemics - research needs and opportunities" 
(Stöhr 2005) These articles were pre-featured in the popular scientific journal, New 
Scientist, on 21 January, 2005 and picked up and commented upon in the BMJ on 29 
January, 2005, which published an article under the rather misleading headline: 
"Research confirms human to human transmission of avian flu". All three sources 
were quoted in the UK press and by experts speaking to the UK press. 
 At several points during the two-months period that we monitored more 
closely, more independent experts or critics made their appearance. They were: 
Professor John Oxford, of London University's Queen Mary and Westfield College, a 
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virologist and one of the world's leading authorities on the disease (who went on to 
dominate the media coverage in late 2005), Professor Hugh Pennington, retired head 
of the Institute of Animal Health and a microbiologist at Pirbright in Surrey (who had 
been a very vocal critic of the slaughter policy during the FMD crisis in 2001), and 
Professor Roy Anderson, a leading epidemiologist and infectious diseases expert 
(whose research group at Imperial College, London, had been instrumental in 
shaping governmental policy during the FMD crisis in 2001).  
Many articles debated the use of Tamiflu (Day 2005), an anti-viral drug made 
by Roche, which can reduce the severity of flu symptoms. Tamiflu would be the only 
available treatment for avian flu for which no vaccine exists and for which a vaccine 
can only be developed once the new strain has emerged. Some experts believe that 
the use of Tamiflu could buy time so that vaccines targeted against any particular 
strain of human flu, mutated from avian viruses, could be developed. Professor 
Oxford was one of the experts who contributed to this debate in interviews with the 
Observer Magazine and the Independent, for example.    
 
Professor John Oxford, of London University's Queen Mary and Westfield 
College - one of the world's leading authorities on the disease - says that 
Britain would need some 20 million courses. He said: "This is a national 
emergency." (Independent, 27/02/05, italics added)  
 
On March 2 Dr John Reid, the then Secretary of State for Health, announced the 
stockpiling of 14.6 million courses of Tamiflu as part of a pandemic plan. The 
reassurance this might have provided to 'the public' was however short-lived, as a 
few days later  
 
Professor Hugh Pennington told Radio 4's Farming Today programme: 'I think 
there is a case for looking very seriously at feather imports and saying, well, 
is it wise to be bringing in feathers from countries where this bird flu virus is 
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now pretty well out of control? 'The risk is real that we might be importing the 
avian flu virus along with the feathers.' (Mail on Sunday, 06/03/05, italics 
added)  
 
And finally, Professor Anderson, who had been involved in the FMD crisis and had 
also spoken out during the SARS crisis, is reported as saying:  
 
'I have never seen the international community as agitated about anything as 
this,' he told The Observer. The disease has a mortality rate of around 76 per 
cent, and the average age of death is 17. 'Although it sounds alarmist, the 
balanced view is that we are overdue a major pandemic,' Anderson said. 
(Observer, 27/03/05, italics added)  
 
In the early months of 2005 (a time when political parties in the UK prepared for a 
general election), experts and various representatives of opposition parties speaking 
to the press accused the government of not doing enough about avian flu, that is, 
about not acting forcefully enough on the advice by the WHO. Comparisons were 
made with Australia, France and Canada (which had suffered a major outbreak of 
SARS in 2003), which, it seems, were all better prepared for a pandemic than the 
UK. Dr Reid and Chief Medical Officer Professor Sir Liam Donaldson defended the 
government's plans, trying to steer a course between preparing for a potential 
pandemic and making people anxious about this process. 
Our analysis of the newspaper output, featuring several key 'trigger quotes', 
shows that from the end of January onwards (when articles began to appear in the 
NEJM, the BMJ, The Lancet and New Scientist) experts seem to have led a rather 
systematic campaign of instilling fear in governments and citizens, and of urging 
governments to prepare for 'action'. The underlying motive of heightening awareness 
for an impending pandemic was probably to use the scientific status of experts to 
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cause a shift in public policy, e.g. to increase national and global resource allocation 
for public health. 
The heightening of pandemic awareness was achieved through the strategic 
use of what one can call 'scare quotes' in leading scientific journals and press 
releases, scare statistics, such as the 1968 Hong Kong pandemic which killed 30,000 
Britons and over 1 million people worldwide, scare historical references, such as the 
flu pandemics of 1918 and 1997, referenced 18 and 11 times respectively in our 
sample of 51 articles, and scare diseases such as smallpox, mentioned 4 times. The 
fear campaign was led on several fronts, from the WHO downwards (Klaus Stöhr and 
Shigeru Omi), through the US CDC and the AAAS (Nancy Cox and Julie Gerberding), 
to UK pandemic pundits (John Oxford and Hugh Pennington). UK government 
officials, by contrast, tried to be more reassuring. This, again, changed towards the 
end of 2005 when Liam Donaldson caused some panic when he announced several 
times that at least 50,000 people might die if a flu pandemic struck the UK. 
In the sociology of representations (Wagner and Kronberger 2001) such 
symbolic dates and statistics are seen as circulating in specific milieus and can be 
used to make risk events meaningful within these contexts, to provide certain 
„visions‟ of risk events. These symbols, just as the pragmatic markers we shall 
analyse later, can be compared to what social scientists working with the social 
amplification of risk model (Kasperson 1992) call „risk signals‟ which can either 
intensify or attenuate awareness of risk. Such symbolic signals are important 
because they serve as anchors used by the media to relay knowledge between the 
scientific and lay realms (Joffe and Haarhoff 2002: 956). The 1918 pandemic, for 
example, functioned predominantly as an „alarmist anchor‟. In the following we shall 
see how symbolic risk signals of this kind, as well as pragmatic markers, such as 
„warn‟ or „alarm‟, which are risk signals of a different kind, were integrated into 
distinctive discursive patterns. 
 
Discursive patterns and cultural meanings  
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In this section the focus will be on revealing patterns of discourse that structured the 
UK media coverage of avian flu in early 2005. These patterns cluster around a 
scientific discourse of 'early warnings' which, once it entered the sphere of the 
media, contributed to a 'rhetoric of fear' in the newspapers that reported them and a 
governmental discourse of 'wait and see' which contributed to a 'rhetoric of blame' in 
the media. The two discourses raised quite different expectations, one of urgent 
action and one of caution, a clash that might have contributed to a general 'discourse 
of uncertainty'. We shall first examine how warnings were framed, then how 
metaphors were used and finally how historical reference points and references to 
other diseases contributed to these three main discursive clusters. 
 
An emergent rhetoric of fear 
The warnings issued by scientists and experts either in editorials of scientific journals 
or in interviews with the media from the end of January 2005 onwards were reported 
in the UK press. In this process their illocutionary force was amplified in various 
ways. This process of amplification occurs when the situation of use (in this case the 
newspaper article using information gleaned from scientific journals and interviews 
with experts) is exploited intentionally in order to enrich the interpretation of 
utterances. However, this new context of use can also amplify a message 
unintentionally, by provoking associations with popular culture and popular 
imagination that were not foreseen by the experts and scientists and possibly even 
not by the journalists themselves. In this process the relatively moderate rhetoric of 
fear displayed by scientists can be pragmatically and sometimes dramatically 
strengthened in the process of citation or iteration (Slinn 1999). Whether this then 
leads to an 'amplification' of risk as perceived by the reading public is another 
matter, which we cannot address in this paper (Pidgeon et al. 2003; Petts and 
Murdoch 2001) 
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 Illocutionary force markers such as warn were used 57 times in the corpus of 
51 articles; perlocutionary force markers such as fear and threaten were used 34 and 
37 times respectively in the corpus. Interestingly, the majority of illocutionary force 
markers were used in relation to statements made by scientific authorities, with 53 
out of the 57 uses of warn referring to an expert, scientist or a named scientific 
body. In most cases illocutionary force markers were used by the newspapers to 
introduce quotes made by experts or scientists indirectly, for example, "Bird flu could 
put Britain in quarantine, warns scientist" (Observer, 27/03/05), but only in very few 
cases were they used to frame direct verbatim quotes. They were however used 
strategically by the experts themselves, such as Stöhr. Cox of the American CDC, on 
the other hand, used a perlocutionary force marker when she said "I think it is very 
frightening to see such a high case fatality rate" (quoted in Express, Guardian, 
Times, italics added).  
The quantitative analysis of our two-month sample, together with the study of 
'trigger quotes' and pragmatic markers, shows that the much-maligned journalists 
were not wholly responsible for overemphasising the possibility of an avian flu threat. 
Scientists lead a concerted campaign of fear and warning, which consequently made 
the media sit up and listen and with them governments around the world.  
This pragmatic strengthening achieved by the media was further enhanced by 
the repetition of scientists' own use of adjectives such as inevitable, ominous, and 
overdue, and by their use of disaster metaphors, which we shall analyse below. 
These rhetorical enhancements may have contributed to a rhetoric of fear, based on 
negative visions and evoking negative expectations, which went far beyond the initial 
warnings of a pandemic threat. 
For many years the media have been "characterised as the distorting lens 
obscuring communication between scientists and the public" (Hargreaves 2001). In 
the case of avian flu the media seem to have been rather more the direct conduit of 
scientific information that scientists and scientific journal editors ordinarily might only 
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dream of. The journalistic lens seems not so much to have distorted the message as 
to 'heat it up', just as a lens can bundle light and generate heat.   
 
The politics of fear and its consequences 
It was argued at the beginning of this article that all utterances, as well as 
expectations and metaphors can have a performative force and that "expectations 
mobilize the future into the present" (Brown 2003: 3). The early warnings issued by 
the scientists and amplified by the media mobilised governments to implement 
pandemic preparedness plans, mobilised the pharmaceutical industry, especially 
Roche, to rapidly increase the production of antivirals and even began to mobilise 
individuals into exploring ways to escape avian flu infection (although this became 
much more pronounced during the autumn of 2005 and led to an unexpected rise in 
the uptake of the usual seasonal flu vaccination, a subsequent shortage of vaccines, 
which was then blamed on the actions of GP …. which demonstrates that the creation 
of expectations can have unexpected consequences). However, it was also pointed 
out that too many early warnings might lead to cynicism and disengagement. In our 
corpus, this effect of negative hype could be detected in three contributions, towards 
the end of our period of monitoring.  
On March 12, Dr Copperfield, a GP and 'media' doctor, wrote a piece for a 
Saturday supplement of The Times in which he pointed out that   
 
The big numbers being thrown around the press at the moment refer to the 
"inevitable" worldwide outbreak of the avian influenza virus, which is 
limbering up to leap across the species barrier and to start picking on human 
beings.  
Yes, folks. Forget about your evaporating pension, you're all going to die in 
the upcoming flu pandemic. But look on the bright side; it's 20 years overdue, 
so we're lucky to have survived this long.   
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After the BBC had broadcast a docudrama about the eruption of a supervolcano in 
Wyoming on March 13 and 14, 2005, Carol Sarler from the Express entitled her short 
commentary: "Another date with doom" and wrote:   
 
If the supervolcano in Wyoming blows, billions of us will die. That's if the 
avian flu pandemic hasn't got us first... Or if we haven't all been scared to 
death by useless predictions of doom that we can't do a damn thing about 
anyway. (Express, 16/03/05)  
 
Mick Hulme, a Times columnist and editor of the critical online journal spiked-online 
(where other articles on the culture of fear were published at the time) wrote a 
polemical piece in The Times: "Get under the sofa or we'll get avian flu when the 
supervolcano erupts": 
 
Never mind Little Britain [title of a popular comedy programme], we appear to 
be living in Chicken Little Britain. 
Whereas the eponymous heroine of that children's story imagined the sky 
falling on her head, many now fantasise about being wiped out by 
supervolcanoes, asteroids or avian flu. The difference is that today's doom-
mongering is not dreamt up by some panicky bird-brain. It is spread by 
leading scientists, serious media organisations and government bodies. In 
Chicken Little Britain, the hens have taken over the farmyard. (Times, 
18/03/05)  
 
This indicates that some opposition was developing to what might be perceived as 
the over-hyping of a bird flu threat by the 'experts', a phenomenon that sociologists 
like Furedi might regard as another instance of a 'politics of fear' (Furedi 2005). "The 
New Oxford Dictionary of English defines hype as 'extravagant or intensive publicity 
or promotion'. In many cases, such publicity or promotion includes expectations that 
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prove in the fullness of time to be overly optimistic." (Sung and Hopkins, in press) 
We shall have to wait and see whether in our case the expectations promoted by the 
scientists were overly alarmist or not. If they turn out to be too pessimistic we might 
have to think about the following scenario, evoked by the New York Times at the end 
of 2005:  
 
"There's so much expectation for it [avian flu] to develop into a pandemic that 
if it does not in the next year or two it's quite possible you would see a 
backlash like the 1976 experience," said Dr Taubenberger [referring to a 
predicted epidemic of swine fever among humans in the US in 1976, a 
prediction that did not come true]. "What I fear is that people would make the 
conclusion, falsely, that influenza is not such an important public health 
problem." (Pollack 2005: 5)  
 
Having reviewed the use of scare-quotes by experts and the use of pragmatic 
markers by the newspapers who quote them, let us now take a closer look at the 
metaphors used in stories about avian flu. Were they the product of public or 
scientific imagination? And what was their function? Were they, like the „early 
warnings‟, intended to make their audience sit up, listen and perform certain actions? 
Did they have rhetorical disadvantages as well as rhetorical advantages in 
persuading audiences to act? 
 
Metaphors  
The discourses and metaphors used to frame diseases and epidemics have become a 
prominent subject within linguistics as well as the sociology of health and illness and 
studies of AIDS, FMD and SARS have shown that disease language and action are 
closely linked, especially via metaphors, images and narratives, which evoke certain 
expectations, attitudes, scenarios and ways of acting upon them.  
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When reading the early UK media coverage of a possible bird flu pandemic we 
were astonished to find that metaphors, at least relatively creative metaphors, were 
only rarely used. There were almost no military metaphors for example, which is 
perhaps indicative of the uncertainty about what to do about a pandemic 'in waiting'. 
War-related metaphors were themselves of the almost invisible kind, subtly 
exploiting the conceptual metaphor PREPARING FOR AN EMERGENT INFECTIOUS DISEASE IS 
PREPARING FOR WAR.1 Antiviral drugs were seen as a 'first line of defence', a 'shield' etc. 
and experts were on the 'frontline' of vaccine preparation. Only one headline in the 
tabloid newspaper the Sun used the word war explicitly '£200M war on bird flu' 
(02/03/04) in the context of the announcement of the UK government's avian flu 
contingency plan.  
Personification of the virus, which had also been a major rhetorical device for 
reporting on FMD and SARS in the UK press (Wallis and Nerlich 2005), was 
somewhat more prevalent, but not yet really salient as the virus has not yet become 
'active', in the sense of spreading from human to human. 
More innovative metaphors, some relatively conventional and one totally new 
one were introduced by the experts, not by the newspapers. Just like journalists, the 
scientists using them exploited a well-established “system of associated 
commonplaces” rooted in popular imagination and popular opinion. As the 
philosopher of metaphor Max Black said (speaking about the projection from a 
secondary subject, the metaphor‟s source domain, e.g. storm, onto a primary 
subject, the metaphor‟s target domain, e.g. avian flu):  
 
                                           
1 We follow the convention established in cognitive linguistics to indicate conceptual 
metaphors, such as ARGUMENTS ARE WAR in small capitals. Conceptual metaphors are 
overarching ways of conceptualising relatively abstract ideas in more concrete form, 
and subsume expressions such as “She shot down his argument”, “He surrendered to 
her brilliant repartee”; “They fought over the last issue” etc. 
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[…] the secondary subject, in a way partly depending upon the context of 
metaphorical use, determines a set of what Aristotle called endoxa, current 
opinions shared by members of a certain speech community. (Black 1993: 28) 
 
These metaphors, depicting avian flu as a storm, volcano or flood, turned the virus 
into a natural or elementary force or an animal, similar to some of the metaphors of 
fire, flood and predator used during the FMD outbreak. The most novel metaphor was 
used by Professor John Oxford: 
 
THE VIRUS IS A GREYHOUND:  
 
'At the moment it's a slow greyhound of a virus. It's when it develops into a 
normal greyhound that we're in for it,' he [John Oxford] says. […] But one 
thing is certain: if the virus does become - to recall Professor Oxford's analogy 
- a normal greyhound, jet travel will speed it round the globe in days. 
(Observer Magazine, 20/03/04)  
 
The greyhound metaphor can be regarded as an expression of the conceptual 
metaphor DEALING WITH DISEASE IS A RACE, which was prominent during the FMD 
epidemic, an epidemic that developed suddenly and spread very fast. The speed with 
which FMD spread was blamed on globalisation and the increase in animal 
movements across the UK. Given global (jet) traffic, the new virus, just like SARS in 
2003, may spread equally rapidly leaving equally little time to prepare or to be 
'outraced' by science. 
During the SARS outbreak, which coincided with the Iraq war, some 
commentators had talked about the virus as a form of natural "bioterrorism," and 
had discussed it in the context of modernity and globalisation. This was also the 
focus of two contributions to the avian flu debate in our sample.  
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THE VIRUS IS A NATURAL BIOTERRORIST 
 
Prof Pennington said: "[…] this is the biggest threat to the human race. It far 
outweighs bioterrorism, this is natural bio-terrorism. It won't spare anybody." 
(Express, 04/03/05) 
 
"Forget al-Qaeda, the biggest terrorist threat we face today is Mother Nature." 
[quote from interview with John Oxford] (Guardian, 20/03/05)  
 
Here the virus becomes one of the most feared and chilling 'enemies' of modern 
times. In his recent book, Anthrax: Bioterror als Phantasma, Sarasin (2004) argues 
that all political ideologies of the 20th century are rooted in the utopia of cleansing 
and purity on the one hand and the fear of infection and poisoning on the other.  
In our corpus we found that newspapers use the pandemic threat to set up a 
series of implicit dichotomies which distinguish between the 'purity' of truth, 
rationality and civilized society and the 'contagion' of a (natural) terrorism, which is 
projected as the embodiment of uncivilized society and superstition. An outbreak of 
bird flu in humans could affect politics on a global scale. Cultural scientists and social 
scientists therefore need to monitor very closely the discourses that emerge and that 
might congeal into a politics of plague.2  
 
Disaster Metaphors  
                                           
2 A first draft of this paper was presented at the conference “Invisible Enemies: the 
cultural meaning of infection and the politics of „plague‟”, University of Zürich, 21-24 
September, 2005. We would like to thank the participants for many useful hints and 
comments.  
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The most frequently used metaphors were however not derived from modernity (be 
it greyhound racing or bioterrorism) but had their conceptual roots in archetypal 
images of natural or elementary forces such as air, earth, fire and water.  
 
THE VIRUS IS A STORM: 
 
Avian influenza: perfect storm now gathering? (Editorial/Lancet 2005: 82) 
 
We need to put up safeguards while the storm is still gathering (Stöhr, 2005: 
407)  
 
This metaphor was then quoted verbatim in The Independent (01/01/05) together 
with a quote including the illocutionary force marker 'warning', turning a pandemic 
warning into a storm warning. Shortly after we had analysed such warnings 
Hurricane Katrina caused enormous damage to New Orleans and Louisiana in August 
2005. Just like the memories of the Tsunami which revitalised the metaphor of the 
virus as an earthquake and a food (see below), this storm impacted on how avian flu 
warnings were framed.  
 
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which demonstrated the high cost of 
complacency, the world is beginning to heed WHO warnings – health experts 
from international organizations and officials from more than 65 countries met 
last week in Washington to discuss a coordinated response to bird flu… (Walsh 
2005: 27) 
 
Flu season comes every year as reliably as hurricane season. If we shore up 
our defences against both, we will be in a much stronger position when the 
“big ones” hit. (Editorial/Scientific American 2005: 3) 
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In this case the devastation wrought by hurricane Katrina and the mapping of this 
past (storm) event together with the mapping of the storm metaphor onto a future 
pandemic event, gives the storm metaphor an added literal twist and heightens its 
performative potency. It mobilises the past into the present as well as the future.  
 
THE VIRUS IS AN EARTHQUAKE: 
 
Another expert, Liam Donaldson (quoted in the Daily Telegraph, 02/03/05, Express, 
02/03/05, Times, 02/03/05), used a different scenario, not that of a storm gathering, 
but that of an earthquake. However, the metaphor was only evoked through words 
associated with earthquake in a semantic network, such as epicentre and impact. It 
overlaps to some extent with the storm metaphor and the flood metaphor (see 
below), as in all three cases, earthquake, volcano, and flood, the image is of a 
catastrophe that starts at a 'source' and then 'sweeps' through its surroundings with 
unstoppable force. This image became even more salient after 26 December, 2004 
when a tsunami, caused by an underwater earthquake, hit populations living on the 
shores of the Indian Ocean. 
The most frequent metaphor used by scientists was that of a flood:  
 
THE VIRUS IS A FLOOD   
 
Past pandemics have typically hit world populations like a flash flood. They 
have started abruptly and explosively, swept through populations, and left 
considerable damage in their wake. They could not be stopped but peaked 
rapidly and subsided almost as abruptly as they begin. (Stöhr, 2005) 
 
Scott Gottlieb's article (in the BMJ) highlights what is now an actual threat to 
the world's population. The Tsunami in Asia illustrated one acute natural 
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trauma with thousands of deaths, that catastrophe pales into insignificance 
when compared with an influenza pandemic. (Higson, BMJ/letter, 2005)  
 
The newspapers did not pick up these metaphors of flooding but used the relatively 
dead metaphor of 'waves' of an epidemic which had been used by scientists. They 
also did not make the connection with the Tsunami, despite the fact that there too 
the sea surges had struck in two waves. 
Avian flu is one of a series of 'emerging infectious diseases'. Describing it as a 
storm, an earthquake, a flood or even a greyhound, has benefits and limitations. 
Amongst the benefits are the arousal of a sense of urgency, notoriously difficult to 
provoke on a global level; this might lead to setting a firm agenda for research, to 
funds being allocated nationally and globally, to nations working together to prevent 
the spread of the disease and so on.  There are also drawbacks, as such metaphors 
might lead to disaster-prediction-fatigue. Metaphors can therefore be performative in 
a positive and in a negative sense. 
Furthermore, metaphors of a storm, an earthquake and a flood evoke so-
called natural disasters over which scientists and policy makers have arguably no 
control (although, it should be stressed that the term natural disaster is debatable, 
as the damage done by the Tsunami or hurricane Katrina for example, was 'caused' 
by building densely populated dwelling places close to the shore). Avian flu has a 
man-made source - the way poultry is reared in crowded conditions and in close 
proximity with people. There are options of controlling the disease 'at source' before 
it (a) mutates (for which it needs a large bird population) and (b) spreads out of 
control, i.e. becomes a 'flood', 'earthquake' or 'storm', namely slaughter and/or 
vaccination. The use of natural disaster metaphors may therefore obscure the 
availability of such options, which are predicated on global support for impoverished 
nations and are therefore difficult to achieve. 
 
Historical references and references to other diseases 
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We mentioned above that newspapers often seek to give current events socially 
recognised meaning by linking them to or anchoring them in historically well-
established images. We found in the corpus a strong pattern of reference to previous 
flu pandemics, in particular to the so-called Spanish Influenza of 1918 (referenced 18 
times), the 1968 flu pandemic in Hong Kong and the SARS epidemic of 2003, both of 
which were referenced 16 times in the corpus. In fact, these historical allusions were 
more salient even than the 11 references made to the actual primary cause of the 
avian flu scare - the discovery of the first cases of humans infected with H5N1 in 
Hong Kong in 1997.  
This shift of emphasis to past pandemics contributes to the rhetoric of fear by 
imbuing the as yet minor bird flu outbreak with historical significance, which 
obscures the fact that the current strain of avian flu has as yet killed only a relatively 
small number of people who had direct contact with poultry. 
 
This would seem to suggest that while, as we discussed above, the media does not 
seem to have been overtly involved in the hyping up of the avian flu virus, the ways 
in which it has historically framed the pandemic threat continue to reproduce and 
enhance the rhetoric of fear begun by the scientists. We would argue that this 
recurrent discourse is performative in representing not a desire to worry unduly an 
unsuspecting public but to encourage someone to take the blame for what ultimately 
has, unlike a natural disaster, a man-made cause.  
 
An emergent rhetoric of blame 
We mentioned above that the use of natural disaster metaphors might obscure the 
availability of options for controlling the development and spread of avian flu. A 
possible explanation for this could be that rather than find a solution to a relatively 
intractable problem the media would rather apportion blame. On March 5, David 
Jones wrote a piece of investigative journalism for The Daily Mail in which he claimed 
that  
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We should not blame the villagers for making this fatal mistake. We should 
blame Prime Minister Thaksin. From the moment bird-flu broke out in Thailand 
- probably as early as November 2003 - he and his cronies had staged a 
cynical cover-up to protect the country's Pounds 750 million poultry export 
industry.  
 
Although this is the only article that makes an explicit accusation, many other 
articles were inscribed with the rhetoric of blame and expressed particular 
exasperation against what was perceived as the British Government's 'wait and see' 
attitude towards the pandemic threat or its complacency.  
 
A discourse of uncertainty 
The two discourses that structured the media coverage of the pandemic threat, that 
of fear and that of blame, raised quite different expectations, one of urgent action 
and one of caution, a clash that might have contributed to establishing a general 
discourse of uncertainty. The uncertainty was especially stark for policy makers who 
had to be seen to listen to the warnings issued by the scientists but who also had to 
justify committing already scarce public health resources to funding a response to an 
unpredictable but potentially catastrophic event. In their attempts to consolidate the 
reality of the pandemic threat, both the media and the experts constructed the avian 
flu virus as something unknown and above all alien (often referring to the virus as a 
'mutant' one). The problem with this is that while it may create the kind of benefits 
for society that we have identified, it also mitigates the perceived potential for 
fighting back against a threat which is extremely virulent, but more worryingly, 
unpredictable and invisible.  
 
Conclusion 
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In this paper we have tried to link the sociology of metaphor to the sociology of 
expectations via insights from pragmatics, arguing that both metaphors and 
expectations can have a performative force and adding to this the analysis of 
pragmatic markers that can work as risk signals and amplify the message that 
scientists want to convey, the expectations they want to create and the actions they 
want the audience of their „early warnings‟ to perform. 
In 2003 Brown wrote:   
 
When we examine the journeys or travels that biotechnology expectations 
make in their passage from laboratory to the news page it is absolutely clear 
that it is no longer possible to go on simply blaming the media for hyping 
things up. Research communities are crucial participants in the production of 
hype. (Brown 2003: 14)  
 
We have shown that it is not possible to blame the media entirely for hyping up fears 
about a global pandemic of bird flu, at least as far as the coverage in UK national 
newspapers in mid-2005 is concerned. Research communities, global and local, 
scientific journal editors, as well as various government officials and pandemic 
'pundits' were crucial participants in the production of awareness, fear and the 
attribution of blame.  The media can however pragmatically amplify the message 
that the scientists want to convey and therefore intensify an emergent rhetoric of 
fear, blame and uncertainty. The emergent rhetoric of fear and blame in a climate of 
uncertainty has consequences for the relation between science and society, the 
public understanding of science and for the policy making process. Raising 
expectations, be it of risk in the case of avian flu or of bounty in the case of 
biotechnology, is a difficult balancing process, between overstating the case and 
understating the case, and between shoring up trust in promises/warnings or eroding 
it. Disparities between expectations and eventual realities can also have "serious 
costs in terms of reputations, misallocated resources and investment"  (Brown 2003: 
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1), for example in drug development, especially antivirals and vaccines, or in the 
distortion of policy priorities regarding animal and human health, the diversion or 
misallocation of funds and so on. 
So far we have argued that it is possible to use insights from the sociology of 
expectations to shed light on some aspects of the media coverage surrounding avian 
influenza. However, it is also necessary to reflect on possible ways in which the 
nexus between the media analysis of avian flu and the sociology of expectations 
might break down.  The sociology of positive expectations deals with how new 
technologies „come into being‟. The sociology of negative expectations, at least in 
this case, does not deal with how a pandemic „comes into being‟ but with how 
audience reactions come into being. In the case of „positive‟ expectations, studied by 
Brown and others in relation to biotechnology, the outcome for the promoter of a 
new biotechnological advance depends on whether the expectations attached to it 
come true or not. In the case of negative expectations, associated in our case with a 
pandemic of avian flu the outcome for the promoter is not dependent on whether or 
not the expectation comes true, but on the actions that the audience takes. For this 
case then, there are two variables: whether people will take action or not based on 
the negative expectation and whether or not the expectation will come true or not. 
First scenario: the audience does not take any action. If the pandemic arises then the 
promoters of the negative expectation are vindicated. However, if the pandemic does 
not arise, then the promoters are discredited. Second scenario: the audience takes 
some sort of action. If the pandemic occurs, the promoters can say that the audience 
did not take enough action. If the pandemic does not occur, the promoters can say 
that whatever measures taken by the audience (slaughter, vaccination, antivirals, 
quarantine, etc.) were enough to contain the pandemic. 
There is therefore seems to be a difference between positive and negative 
expectations that needs to be further explored. One could say that negative 
expectations are a self-fulfilling prophesy to the extreme. The outcome affects the 
promoter negatively only if the audience does not act. The important thing here is 
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that once the audience takes some form of action, the promoters are vindicated. The 
blame is not on them. In fact, there is only one way in which the blame can go to the 
promoter, if the audience does not act and the predictions do not come true. 
Expectations have to be performative then, in the sense of making the audience act 
in certain ways. But there are differences between early promises and early 
warnings, differences that have to be examined in more detail in the future.  
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